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WELCOME TO ISSUE NO #095
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📆 Today’s Rundown
Hey {{first_name}} 👋, I hope you’re having a great week! In the last issue, we discussed about SaaS Unit Economics, and now we are moving with the next topic from Reporting content.
Let’s talk about ⬇️
Due Diligence
An investor was walking a founder through their model on a diligence call.
Pointed at one cell. The churn assumption. 0.8% monthly.
"How did you get to this number?"
"Based on cohort analysis."
"Which cohort? Over what time period?"
"Our customer base."
"Can you send me the underlying data?"
It didn't exist. Not in any reproducible form. The 0.8% came from averaging the three best months of trailing churn, sometime the previous year, and it had been sitting in the model long enough that the founder had genuinely forgotten where it came from.
The investor moved on politely. Two days later: a pass. Concerns about model defensibility and assumption rigor.
Six weeks to rebuild the model with documented assumptions. By the time the new deck was ready the market had cooled, and the round closed roughly 20% below the original anchor.
Not because the business was bad. Because one number had no owner.

one cell. the whole model.
TL;DR
Diligence isn't testing your documents
📋 FOUND IN A BOARD DECK
Where deals actually stall
The assumption ownership test
The same fact, opposite signals
Build the room before you need it
What they're looking for in the customer data
The 60-day audit
Diligence isn't testing your documents
It's testing three things:
Is this company what it says it is. Where are the risks you're not mentioning. And — the one founders underestimate — does this team understand its own business well enough to allocate capital.
That third question is why the churn story ended the way it did. A model full of undefended assumptions doesn't read as a metrics problem. It reads as a leadership problem.
The bar moves by stage:
Stage | What they're testing | Depth |
|---|---|---|
Seed | Team, product, market | P&L, burn, runway |
Series A | Traction, unit economics | Model review, CAC/LTV, churn cohorts |
Series B | Efficiency, repeatability | Three-statement, scenarios, headcount plan |
Series C | Scalability, path to profit | Audit-ready, unit economics by segment |
Documents matter. Explanations matter more.
📋 FOUND IN A BOARD DECK
One thing I saw this month that shouldn't have made it into the room.
The slide: headcount plan. Twelve roles, start dates, functions. Genuinely well built.
The problem: the financial model showed 25% revenue growth in the same period. The headcount plan showed flat hiring in sales and customer success.
Nobody had reconciled the two. They'd been built by different people, in different tools, at different times, and never put on the same page.
An investor finds that in about eight minutes. And once they do, they stop believing the revenue line.
The fix: one shared row list. Same roles, same timing, same cost assumptions, referenced by both documents. Not a reconciliation exercise — a single source.
two documents. one company. no relationship.
Where deals actually stall
Founders worry about legal and HR. Those are a distant third and fourth.
Financial model gaps and unit economics issues account for more than half of diligence-stage complications at both Series A and Series B/C.
Five specific problems generate most of it:
Flat-line burn. $200K/month for 36 months, unchanged, while the model projects 3x revenue growth. Those two things cannot both be true. Model burn bottom-up from headcount — salary, start date, 15–20% benefits load, equipment, software. That version survives questions.
Blended CAC. A single $4,200 figure tells an investor nothing. If paid search is $11,000, inbound organic is $1,800, and outbound is $7,500, the blend is hiding the entire story about where you actually grow efficiently.
NRR and GRR on different cohort bases. Trailing twelve months for one, rolling quarter for the other, enterprise-only for one and all customers for the other. The numbers aren't comparable and you can't use them together to defend anything.
Runway that doesn't match the model. Data room says 18 months, the model implies 14 under any reasonable stress case. The investor will assume 18 is what you want them to believe and 14 is what's real.
No scenario infrastructure. A single-case model says you haven't pressure-tested your own assumptions. "If growth comes in 30% below plan, what do you cut first and what does that do to runway?" is a question you should be able to answer in the room, with a model behind it.
SaaS Finance Lab — 30 founding seats
I'm opening a small group for SaaS finance operators. Every month: one finished financial model and one live session building it — ARR bridges, burn multiple, usage-based pricing, board packs.
Not a course. Just the models I build for clients, plus a room where you can ask why line 47 is doing that.
$490 for the first year, capped at 30 people. $990 after. Closes Aug 30th.
The assumption ownership test
Every forward-looking input needs a person who can explain it. Not a tool. Not a consultant. A person inside the company.
"We assume 15% monthly growth" is not an assumption. It's a wish.
"We assume 15% monthly growth based on Q3 and Q4 trailing conversion from inbound, which ran 12–18% over the last two quarters" is something an investor can interrogate and then accept.
Same principle on burn. When they ask why it goes from $400K to $650K in Q2 of year two, "that's when headcount scales" is the wrong answer. The right one:
Four enterprise AEs at $180K fully loaded, plus two CSMs at $130K — that's the capacity model for the ARR we're projecting in that period.
That's the level that passes at Series B and C. When it's missing, it surfaces in a single question.
every number has a person. or it has a problem.
The same fact, opposite signals
A company heading into Series B had a concentration problem. Largest customer at 23% of ARR.
They didn't fix it before raising. They also didn't hide it.
First call with every investor, on the table immediately: "Our largest customer is 23% of ARR. Here's what we've done to reduce dependency, here's the evidence they're not at risk, and here's what happens to the business if they leave."
The data room matched — a slide titled "Customer concentration" with the number, the trend (down from 31% eighteen months earlier), and the specific actions taken. No spin.
Two firms said the proactive disclosure was the reason they got comfortable with it. Closed at the founder's target valuation.
Here's the thing. If an investor had found that themselves, in week three, after the founder had spent two calls describing a diversified customer base — same 23%, completely different meeting.
When you surface it, it's judgment. When they find it, it's a credibility question about everything else in the file.
Every company has problems. Investors know that. What they can't work with is discovering one you knew about.
Build the room before you need it
The most common mistake is assembling the data room reactively — after interest, after a term sheet. Now you're gathering documents under time pressure while also running investor calls and negotiating terms.
Start 60–90 days before outreach. Seven folders:
01 Corporate and cap table — incorporation, fully diluted cap table including SAFEs and notes, shareholder agreements, board consents
02 Financials and metrics — 24 months monthly P&L, balance sheet, cash flow, three-year model with assumptions tab, MRR bridge, runway calc
03 Legal and contracts — material customer contracts, IP assignments for everyone including contractors, vendor agreements, litigation disclosure
04 Product and technology — architecture as it actually is, SOC 2 status or an explicit decision not to pursue it, roadmap
05 Customers and GTM — customer list with ARR and contract dates, churn log, pipeline snapshot, cohort retention chart
06 People and HR — org chart, headcount plan, option grants
07 Board and investor materials — last three board decks, six months of investor updates
Date your filenames. 2026-04_Financial-Model.xlsx, not Model_v3_FINAL_actual_use_this.xlsx. View-only access, NDA in place, audit log of who opened what.
the alternative
What they're looking for in the customer data
Four numbers, and they'll find them whether or not you present them:
No single customer above 15–20% of ARR at Series A. A company at $8M ARR with one customer at $2M isn't an $8M ARR company for diligence purposes. It's a $2M customer-dependent business with $6M of supporting revenue, and that's how they'll model it.
GRR above 85%. 90%+ at Series B.
NRR above 100%. 110%+ is the number that changes the conversation. But present it by cohort — a blended 112% can be two large expanding accounts covering a base that's quietly contracting, and Series B investors have seen that pattern enough to ask specifically.
Pipeline coverage of 3–4x for the current quarter.
The 60-day audit
Run this before outreach, not during.
Corporate. Cap table fully diluted and current. Founder vesting executed. IP assignments for every founder, employee, and material contractor. Board minutes complete for 24 months. No unresolved co-founder departures or verbal equity promises.
Financials. 24 months of monthly P&L reconciling to bank statements. Deferred revenue schedule consistent with how you report ARR. Model with an explicit assumptions tab and three scenarios. Runway on 3-month trailing net burn, reconciling to the model. CAC by channel. NRR and GRR with one documented methodology. Cohort retention for the last 6–8 cohorts.
Product. Architecture doc reflecting current state, not the planned one. Twelve months of uptime history. SOC 2 timeline or a stated decision.
Customers. Current list with ARR and contract dates. Concentration analysis. Churn log with who, when, and why. Material contracts reviewed for non-standard terms.
Team. Headcount plan that ties to the model — same roles, same timing, same costs. Option grants authorized and documented. Clean paper trail on any departure in the last twelve months.
The Bottom Line
The founders who close fastest don't have the cleanest companies.
They're the ones most organized about knowing and communicating what they have.
Build the room early. Own every assumption. Know your unit economics at cohort level, not aggregate. And when gaps exist — they will — surface them with context before someone finds them without it.
That churn assumption cost six weeks and 20% of a valuation. Nobody was hiding anything. The number just didn't belong to anyone.
Reply "DILIGENCE" and I'll send the pre-diligence audit checklist — the full document list by category, the assumptions ownership template, and the data room folder structure.
Third espresso of the morning and Valencia is doing that thing where it's 30 degrees at 9am.
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Alex Stojanovic
Chief Finance Ninja | Fiscallion
Fractional CFO & FP&A Agency
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